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REAL PROPERTY LAW: STATE POLICE POWER HELD
INSUFFICIENT TO REGULATE REGISTRATION OF
EXISTING POSSIBILITES OF REVERTER AND POWERS
OF TERMINATION AS CONDITION FOR PRESERVATION
The New York Court of Appeals recently held that the New York
Real Property Law, requiring registration of possibilities of re-
verter and powers of termination as a condition for their preser-
vation, was invalid in its attempted retrospective application.
This decision may have persuasive impact beyond New York, as
most marketable title acts contain a similar provision.
IN RECENT YEARS several states have enacted statutes to pro-
mote the marketability of land.- Although these statutes arguably
violate sections of the federal Constitution and of the individual
state constitutions, only a few courts have addressed themselves
1 FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1963); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 37e (1965); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 83, § 10(a) (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1101 to -1110 (Supp. 1965); IowA
CODE § 614.17 (1962); H.F. 115, 1 IOWA LEG. SERV. 1965 at 19 (March 15, 1965);
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 381.221-.223 (1960); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 32 (1956), and clh.
184, §§ 19, 26-30 (Supp. 1964); MICH. STAT. ANN §§ 26.1271-.1279 (1953), as amended,
MICH. STAT. RELEASE No. 15 at 1420; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1964); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 76-288 to -298 (1958); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2102 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 345 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-42.1 (7 ADV. LEG. SERV. 1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19A-01 to -11 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-.55 (Page
Supp. 1964); S.D. CODE §§ 51.16B01-.16BI4 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1 to
-9-10 (1963), as amended, UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-6 (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. § 330.15
(1963), as amended, Wis. Laws 1965, ch. 66, § 2 (amending section number to §
893.15).
The promotion of the alienability of land has long been accepted public policy.
Recording systems were adopted in the furtherance of this policy and operated to
remove many of the uncertainties involved in land transactions under the common
law. Basye, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47 IOwA L. REV. 261-63
(1962). However, this purpose has been subverted by the system itself. Searches are
tedious and cumbersome, and many ancient interests which have long been forgotten
by the parties remain on the records as notice to a future purchaser. Economic
development of the land is thus frequently impaired. This situation has caused grow-
ing concern, and many states have undertaken reforms. Id. at 264. See Aigler, Con.
stitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, 50 MICH. L. REv. 185-86 (1951).
One frequently employed reform is the adoption of a "marketable title" act-so
denoted because several early versions of this type of statute undertook to define
what titles should be accepted as merchantable. This reform was generally tailored
to one aspect of the problem-the reduction in the period of title search and ex-
amination. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TrrLEs § 171, at 260 (1953). It soon became evident
that this reform alone would not solve the broad problem of promoting the economic
utilization of land. See SIdlEs & TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY
LEGIsLATION 4-6 (1960).
Under the usual recording system, the recording of an interest will give notice of
its existence for all time; therefore, an effort to increase marketability of land must
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to a determination of their validity.2 The most recent case to focus
on the question is Board of Educ. v. Miles,3 in which the New York
Court of Appeals held a New York marketability statute invalid.
That statute, section 345 of New York's Real Property Law, pro-
vides that:
... a condition subsequent or special limitation restricting the
use of land and the right of entry or possibility of reverter created
thereby shall be extinguished and become unenforceable, either
at law or in equity, . . . unless within the time specified in this
section a declaration of intention to preserve it is recorded . .. .4
The law, enacted in 1958,5 provided that if the special limitation
or condition subsequent was created prior to 1931, the declaration
should be recorded prior to September 1, 1961.6
The special limitation giving rise to the instant case was effec-
tuated in 1853, when land was conveyed to the Walton Academy.
7
The conveyance was subject to a special limitation restricting the
land to use for school purposes, with the proviso that if it ever ceased
to be so used, it would revert to the grantor and his heirs. In 1962,
the Board of Education, successor to the Walton Academy, ceased
using the land for school purposes. The defendants, heirs and
devisees of the grantor, then claimed title to the land by virtue of
the reversion, and the Board of Education instituted action seeking
a determination of the claim.8
include a method designed to remove encumbrances in the current record as well as
preventing similar ones from being established in the future. It is this retrospective
effect which raises the questions of constitutionality. Id. at 253.
"Marketability acts," as the term is employed in this note, includes not only
"marketable title" acts, but the other retrospective legislation aimed at the same
ultimate goal-the promotion of full economic utilization of land.
'See Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954); Trustees of Schools
of Township No. I v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955); Tesdell v. Hanes,
248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957); Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d
800 (1957); Board of Educ. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 864, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1965).
15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).
'N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 345 (1) (Supp. 1965).
rN.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 865, at 1918-22.
0 N.Y. REr. PROP. Law § 345 (4) (Supp. 1965). The general approach of the law was
to require the notice to be filed between twenty-seven and thirty years after creation
of a condition or limitation, with subsequent renewal of this notice every ten years.
Ibid. Interests which would have been more than thirty years old at the effective date of
the act would not automatically be lost, but could be preserved by recording. Law
Revision Comm'n, Report, N.Y. LEGis. Doc. No. 65, at 281-32 (1958). See note 32
infra. This approach has been suggested by several commentators. See, e.g., Siaras &
TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 1, at xix-xx; Aigler, supra note 1, at 199-201.
7Brief for Respondent, p. 2; Brief for Appellant, p. 3.
8 15 N.Y.2d at 367, 207 N.E.2d at 183, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 131-32.
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Since this limitation was created prior to 1931, it could be pre-
served under the New York statute only by the filing, on or before
September 1, 1961, of a "declaration of intention to preserve" it.0
Although the defendants had in fact filed such a declaration, they
had failed to do so until April, 1962.10 Hence, when the lower
court applied the New York marketability statute,1 it held that by
failing to conform to the statute's requirements the defendants had
lost their right to claim the land under the reverter. The defendants
attacked the statute as an unconstitutional impairment of contract and
as a denial of due process,' 2 but the lower court held that the law
was a "reasonable and salutory public control of the use of a pe-
culiar form of property which, without regulation, could adversely
affect free alienability and development of land," and was therefore
constitutionally valid on both the impairment and due process
issues.' 3
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the court below, hold-
ing that inasmuch as the statute attempted to add to the defendants'
duties under an existing contract for the sale of land, it was
an impairment of their contract rights. 4 The court recognized the
fact that the prohibition against impairment of contracts by a state
is not absolute, and that retrospective state laws impairing vested
rights may be constitutional if adopted in pursuance of the police
power.' 5 However, this requisite nexus with a valid use of the
police power was held to be lacking, and therefore the statute's im-
pairment of contract rights was deemed to be in contravention
of the contract clause.'6
O Id. at 373, 207 N.E.2d at 186, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 186-37.10 Board of Educ. v. Miles, 18 App. Div. 2d 87, 89, 238 N.Y.S.2d 766, 768 (1963).11 The case originated in the Supreme Court-Appellate Division pursuant to N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1946, ch. 316, § 1, and N.Y. Sess. Laws 1930, ch. 87, § 1 (now N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW Rule 3222), which provides that in cases in which there is no dispute of fact the
parties may submit a stipulation of agreed facts. The case may then be decided
directly by the Appellate Division.
12 The law was alleged to have violated U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV; N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 6. Brief for Respondent, p. 3, Brief for Appellants, p. 5.
Neither the decision of the Appellate Division nor that of the Court of Appeals made
specific reference to the constitutional provisions. Since the New York constitution
does not contain a "contract's clause" the courts' decisions on that point must be
based on their construction of the federal Constitution. There was no indication which
provision the Miles court was purporting to interpret.
13 Board of Educ. v. Miles, 18 App. Div. 2d 87, 93, 238 N.Y.S.2d 766, 772 (1963).
1 15 N.Y.2d at 378, 207 N.E.2d at 186, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
I5 1d. at 372, 207 N.E.2d at 184, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 133-34.
16 Id. at 370-71, 207 N.E.2d at 185, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 134-35.
[Vol. 1966: 272
REAL PROPERTY LAW
In adjudging the constitutionality of this statute the court
focused upon the purposes for which a state's legislation may per-
missibly effect impairment of private contracts. The court noted
that "the prevention of fraud against subsequent purchasers has
been generally recognized as a foundation on which the police
power depends in voiding prior unrecorded conveyances . ...- 17
The court concluded that since the New York marketability statute
was not drawn to protect purchasers in good faith, the act could not
be upheld on the familiar fraud-prevention grounds. From this it
was reasoned that if the recording requirements of section 345 were
to be sustained, it would have to be on a theory similar to that of
title registration acts which do not depend for their validity on the
saving grace of prevention of fraud on innocent third parties.18
However, the court noted that the purpose of section 345 was
different from that of title registration laws, which are intended to
protect valid claims, not to dispose of valid but inconvenient ones.' 9
The court also dealt with the contention that a marketability act
could be upheld as a statute of limitation.20 In this respect the court
noted that since the reverter had not matured when it was barred by
the statute, the persons who would have to register it would not be
ascertained.2' Thus, the statute in effect would bar "the remedy
before the right to enforce it has matured .... ," Therefore, in-
stead of "limiting" a right, it extinguished it altogether.
Thus, the court concerned itself with two basic arguments in
the Miles case. First, the court felt that the law could not be upheld
as a valid use of the legislature's power to enact statutes of limitation.
Second, the court concluded that the legislation could not be sus-
tained as a valid use of the police power since the requisite protec-
tive purpose was lacking. The broader question of due process is
implicit in both of these issues. 23 The persuasiveness of the Miles
1 7 d. at 369, 207 N.E.2d at 184, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
VI Id. at 370-71, 207 N.E.2d at 184-85, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 134-35. See text accompanying
notes 28-29 infra. The court noted that the statute purports to operate on the original
parties to the transaction and their successors in interest, "without the justification
of protecting the intervening rights of third persons." Id. at 371, 207 N.E. at 185,
259 N.Y.S.2d at 135. It appears, however, that any such statute is designed to protect
buyers also.
10 Id. at 371-72, 207 N.E.2d at 185-86, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 135-36.
90 Id. at 372-74, 207 N.E.2d at 186-87, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 136-37.
.1 Id. at 373, 207 N.E.2d at 186, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 137. See text accompanying notes
33-34 infra. See generally SIMFs, FUTM INTEREsTS § 724 (1936).
22 15 N.Y.2d at 374, 207 N.E.2d at 187, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
2' Due process acts as a restriction on the form of a statute of limitation which a
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decision in jurisdictions with untested marketability statutes may
well depend upon the court's treatment of these three issues.
Marketable title acts have been characterized as embodying ele-
ments of recording laws, curative acts, and statutes of limitation.24
Although the New York court's opinion did not discuss the curative
aspects of the legislation, a reading of the challenged statute shows
that it was not intended to correct unintentional defects in a con-
veyance to make it correspond with the actual wishes of the par-
ties.25 The court instead dealt with the more analogous theories of
recording acts and statutes of limitation.
The court's negation of the analogy between the marketable
title acts and recording laws seemingly fails to note that recording
acts may serve more than the single purpose of preventing frauds.
The enactment of recording laws may have several objectives. Cer-
state may enact. See note 32 infra. Likewise, due process is both a limitation on,
and is limited by, a state's use of the police power. See Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
The approach adopted by the Court of Appeals in Miles appears to have in-
volved an unarticulated decision as to the limits placed on the police power by due
process, and then an application of the standard thus obtained to the facts of the
case. Such an approach is unfortunate, since a determination of due process require-
ments usually involves a careful weighing of the various factors. See Brock v. North
Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1953). The decision in the Miles case will afford scant
precedential guidance in future litigation to the extent that there is no indication
of the factors considered by the court in finding a due process deficiency in the
statute.
24 See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 106-07, 83 N.W.2d 800, 816 (1957).
In that case the Minnesota court stated that a marketable title act is similar to a
curative act since it may "correct certain defects which have arisen in the execu-
tion of instruments" in the muniments of title, id. at 106, 83 N.W.2d at 816; that it is
similar to a recording act because "it requires notice to be given to the public" of the
existence of certain conditions which may affect the land's marketability, ibid.;
and that it is like a statute of limitations in that unless the notice is filed, "a right
of action to enforce any right, claim, or interest" is not preserved, whether the
claim or interest is "mature or immature and whether it is vested or contingent."
Id. at 107, 83 N.W.2d at 816. Commentators have also noted these analogies. See
SuaES & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4; Aigler, Marketable Title Acts, 46 U.
MImAM L. REv. 47, 57 (1958).
2r See text accompanying note 4 supra. The act does not purport to effectuate
the ultimate intentions of the contracting parties. Instead, it disregards the plain
import of the language of a conveyance and subjects it to the desired public policy.
Thus, any "curative" effect appears to be purely incidental. But see Wilson v.
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902) (discussed in note 32 infra), where a similarly broad
statute of limitations was upheld. The Supreme Court in Wilson quoted with
apparent approval a statement regarding conditions existing at the time of the act
there in question, and discussed the statute from a "curative" standpoint. Id. at 60-61.
Although the incidental curative effect may be insufficient support for the
validity of such a statute, it may affect the decision of a court in an otherwise un-
certain case. See Wilson v. Iseminger, supra; Wichelman v. Messner, supra note 24,
at 106-07, 83 N.W.2d at 816.
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tainly one of these is the prevention of frauds; but another has long
been the promotion of reliance on the public record,26 thus gen-
erally lessening the risks of real estate transactions and resulting in a
more economic use of land. It is this latter purpose which gives rise
to the analogy between marketable title laws and recording acts;
yet this purpose was apparently ignored by the New York court.27
2'An early Massachusetts law illustrates the multi-purpose nature of recording
laws. It stated that it was passed to avoid fraudulent conveyances, "and that every
man may know what estate or interest other men may have in any houses, lands
or other heriditamets [sic] they are to deal in ..... MAss. LAws & LiBERTIFS 1648,
at 13 (1929).
Professor Convin Johnson states that the clear, general purpose of recording
laws is the creation of a public record. He then lists four more specific purposes:
(I) "to enable interested persons . .. to ascertain" the state of a title; (2) "to furnish
admissible evidence of title" in disputes; (3) "to enable owners of equitable in-
terests to protect" them by giving notice to subsequent vendees; and (4) "to
modify the traditional case-law doctrine that purchasers . . . get no better title
than the transferor owned." Johnson, Purposes and Scope of Recording Statutes,
47 IOWA L. REV. 231 (1962).
"The distinguishing characteristic of marketability legislation is its ultimate
goal of promoting the full economic utilization of land. However, in seeking
the attainment of this goal, the legislatures must consider many factors such as the
current status of the state's property law, both statutory and judicial, and par.
ticular local conditions in need of a remedy. Since factors of this kind vary from
state to state, it is not surprising that the final form of statute chosen by the
various state legislatures is not identical. This diversity among the statutes mani-
fests itself in several ways. For example, each legislature tends to describe the goal
of its statute in terms of the more particular problems considered. For purposes
of differentiation, this stated goal may be termed an "intermediate" one since the
ultimate goal, though unarticulated, seldom differs from state to state.
While marketability acts may assume many forms, the bulk of the acts may be
considered as falling into two groups. The first group generally follows the con-
cept of the Model Marketable Title Act which provides:
"Subject to the matters stated in Section 2 hereof, such marketable record
title shall be held by its owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the
land free and clear of all interests, claims or charges whatsoever, the existence of
which depends upon any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred prior
to the effective date of the root of title. All such interests, claims or charges, how-
ever denominated, whether legal or equitable, present or future, whether such in-
terests, claims or charges are asserted by a person sui juris or under a disability,
whether such person is within or without the state, whether such person is
natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are hereby declared to be null
and void." MODEL MuARKTABLE TITLE AcT § 3; SnimS & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 7-8.
Such statutes have as their intermediate goal a reduction in the period of title
search and examination. In this regard, the analogy to the recording act is clear.
Despite the conservative tone of the New York court, most courts would probably
find little difficulty in upholding the burden imposed by statutes of the Model
Act group since it is the same as that imposed under the already familiar record-
ing acts. Statutes of this type include the following: ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83,
§ 10(a)(1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1101 to -1110 (Supp. 1965); IOwA CODE
§ 614.17 (1962); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 184, §§ 26-30 (Supp. 1964); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26.1271-.1279 (1953), as amended, Micu. STATUTE RELEASE No. 15, at 1420; MINN.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Recording laws may be upheld in New York solely on the basis of
fraud prevention,28 but other states have recognized their multi-
purpose nature.29 The authorities cited in Miles do establish that
the prevention of fraud is a sufficient basis for enacting recording
laws.30 However, the Miles opinion indicates that it is a necessary
element of such legislation.31 To the extent that this reasoning is
rejected by other states which recognize purposes other than the pre-
STAT. ANN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288 to -298 (1958); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 47-19A-01 to -11 (1960); OHno Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47-.55 (Page
Supp. 1964); S.D. CODE §§ 51.16B01-.16B14 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1
to -9-10 (1963), as amended, UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-6 (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. §
330.15 (1963), as amended, Wis. Laws 1965, ch. 66, § 2 (amending section number
to § 893.15).
A second group of states may be represented by the New York law involved
in the principal case. See text accompanying note 4 supra. These acts share with
the first group the ultimate purpose of promoting the full economic utilization
of land. However, their intermediate goal is the regulation of specific types of
property interests. There is no sound analogy supporting the burden imposed by
these marketability statutes and the burden imposed by recording laws if one looks
merely at the intermediate purpose. However, in terms of the ultimate purpose of
the laws, the analogy is present. Statutes of this type include the following:
FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1963); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 37e (1965); H.F. 115, 1 IOwA
LEG. SERv. 1965 at 19 (March 15, 1965); Ky. Rnv. STAT. § 381.221-.223 (1960); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 260, § 32 (1956), and ch. 184, § 19 (Supp. 1964); NEB. Rav. STAT.
§ 76-2102 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 345 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-42.1 (7 ADV. LEG. SERv. 1965).
The remoteness of the real analogy between recording laws and marketability
laws of the second type gives the court an option, for it need not probe beyond
the intermediate purpose to seek the law's justification. Apparently, the New York
court was content to accept the intermediate purpose as ultimately controlling, and
on this basis rejected the analogy between the New York law and recording acts.
28 15 N.Y.2d at 371, 207 N.E.2d at 185, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 135 (dictum).
29 See Lewis v. State, 32 Ariz. 182, 256 Pac. 1048 (1927); Wright v. DeFatta, 142
So. 2d 489 (La. Ct. App. 1962), aff'd, 244 La. 251, 152 So. 2d 10 (1963).
so 15 N.Y.2d at 369-70, 207 N.E.2d at 184, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 134. The court
cites as authority: Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 68 (1871); McCracken v.
Hayward, 2 How. (43 U.S.) 608 (1844); Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Pet.
(28 U.S.) 280 (1830); Leonard v. Harris, 147 App. Div. 458, 131 N.Y. Supp. 909,
aff'd, 211 N.Y. 511, 105 N.E. 1089 (1914); Fitzpatrick v. Boylan, 57 N.Y. 433 (1874)
(see dissenting opinion of Commissioner Dwight, id. at 437).
3 15 N.Y.2d at 370, 207 N.E.2d at 184, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 134. See cases cited
note 30 supra. A thorough analysis of precedents cited by the New York court
indicates that they may not support the court's conclusion. Perhaps the most fre-
quently cited of these cases, and the one upon which Miles appeared to most
heavily rely, was Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, supra note 30. In that case,
the United States Supreme Court held that states may constitutionally enact
retroactively effective recording acts and statutes of limitation, based on "reasons
of sound policy." Id. at 290. As an example of such legislation, the Court cited a
New York law [Recording Act of January, 1794, N.Y. Laws 1789-1796, at 480] and
noted that the statute was based on policy considerations sufficient to support its con-
stitutionality. Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, supra note 30, at 290.
This act recited three reasons justifying its enactment: to achieve a remedy for
the uncertain state of titles to certain lands in the state, to detect the persons who
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vention of frauds which constitutionally justify recording laws, the
persuasiveness of the Miles decision will be impaired.
The court's second conclusion, that section 845 necessarily re-
quires registration by unascertained persons and thus violates a
constitutional restriction imposed upon statutes of limitation,32
had been perpetrating frauds in the sale of those lands, and to prevent such frauds
in the future.
The Miles court, in relying on Lamphire, would seem not to have considered, al-
though it may have rejected by implication, the first of these three policy justifica-
tions-the economic interest in remedying uncertainty as to the state of titles to land.
However, there is no indication that the Supreme Court in Lamphire was excluding
this policy as one which may support the validity of such legislation.
The other opinions cited by the Miles court were also relied on as support for the
sweeping generalization that "except for the protection of third parties, . . . [these
cases] would indicate that the recording acts would impair the obligation of contracts
and deprive persons of property without due process of law." 15 N.Y.2d at 371, 207
N.E.2d at 185, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 135. Here again, careful consideration of these cases
indicates that they do not necessitate the conclusion that recording acts are justified
only by the policy of protecting third persons against fraud.
In McCracken v. Hayward, supra note 30, the Supreme Court did no more in this
respect than rely on Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, supra note 30, for the
proposition that not "all state legislation on existing contracts is necessarily repug-
nant to the constitution." McCracken v. Hayward, supra note 30, at 613. This case
therefore does not in any way refute the fact that policies other than the protection
of third persons may justify such statutes.
In Curtis v. Whitney, supra note 30, the Supreme Court held valid a Wisconsin
statute requiring the purchaser of a tax title to give notice to occupiers of the
premises before taking the title. The Court articulated the criterion justifying such
retroactive legislation to be "the public good," id. at 71; and although the decision
was rendered in a case involving legislation protecting third parties (those about to
lose their land for failure to pay taxes), the Court did not attempt to restrict the scope
of the words to that element alone.
The Miles court also cites the dissenting opinion by Commissioner Dwight in
Fitzpatrick v. Boylan, supra note 30. Dwight was arguing for retrospective application
of a law regarding mechanics' liens. His argument was that retrospective legis-
lation was valid if based generally on "reasons of sound policy" (id. at 443, emphasis
supplied by Dwight, quoting from Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, supra note 30),
and that the policy of the new law sought to be applied was the termination of
liens which, if not exercised or enforced within a reasonable time, put too great a
burden on land.
Thus, although there are grounds for distinguishing these decisions on their facts
as the New York court did in the Miles case, that court's conclusions as to the reason-
ing and import of these cases does not appear to be wholly justified.
32Statutes of limitation must not cut off rights abruptly, but must allow time
for holders of interests effected at the time of the passage of the act to preserve their
interests by conforming to the law's requirements. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55,
62 (1902). In this case the Supreme Court adopted a due process-type test stating
that "a statute could not bar the existing rights of claimants without affording this
opportunity; if it should attempt to do so, it would not be a statute of limitations, but
an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport
of its provisions. Ibid.
It is interesting to note the policy being promoted by the statute of limitations in
that case. The statute was specifically enacted to extinguish ground rents-an estate
in land under Pennsylvania law-unless a notice of payment was filed every twenty-
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is likewise open to question. Historically, New York was one of
the few jurisdictions in which certain future interests, including
"possibilities of reverter," were deemed to pass by representation
rather than by descent.3 3 If this doctrine is strictly applied in the
Miles case, the conclusion reached by the court may be justified.
The owner of such an interest would be unknown until the "pos-
sibility" matured. At that time the original grantor's representatives
would be determined, and the estate would vest in them. But prior
to the breach, the representatives would be unknown, and would
have no alienable or devisable rights or interests. 4 However, two
factors cast doubt on the validity of such application in the Miles
case. The first arises out of the narrowing effect on the doctrine of
representation caused by the decision in Nichols v. Haehn,86 a 1959
Appellate Division case which expressly held possibilities of reverter
to be fully alienable and devisable.3 6 On the basis of this decision,
it appears that the defendants in the Miles case did have a recog-
nizable interest capable of being preserved. The second factor
stems from a known exception to the "representation" doctrine.
Although "possibilities of reverter" may not be alienable or de-
visable, they are "releasable" to the owner of the possessory in-
one years. In summarizing the problem, the court took note of the fact that ancient
ground rents, which in all probability have been extinguished, frequently remain on
the public record as blemishes on the title to land and cannot be removed since no
living person has knowledge of them. Id. at 60.
" Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896). See S1mES, FUTURE IN-
TEREsrs § 34, at 111-12 (1951). Simes employs the following example to contrast
the passing of a reverter by representation or descent: "A conveys Blackacre 'to B
and his heirs so long as the premises are used for residence purposes,' thus creating a
determinable fee in B and a possibility of reverter in A. Thereafter A dies intestate
leaving, as his only heir, his son X. Then X dies, leaving as his only heir, his wife W.
Subsequently the land ceases to be used for residence purposes, and the possibility
of reverter becomes a possessory interest. If A had died at the time the possibility
of reverter became possessory, his heir would have been his brother Y. Thus, it is
held that Y and not W takes the land. This is because descent must be traced from
A.... and W, being unrelated to A cannot be his heir." Id. at 111.
81 See note 33 supra.
35 8 App. Div. 2d 405, 411, 187 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (1959). The court noted that
although Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896), framed its dis-
cussion in terms of "possibilities of reverter," the interest actually involved in that
case was not what is commonly known as a possibility of reverter, but rather what
is called a power of termination. Thus the court felt that although some authors had
accepted Upington v. Corrigan, supra, at face value, that decision was not true
authority for the case where a true possibility of reverter was involved.
8 This decision established New York's acceptance of the general rule regarding
possibilities of reverter. In the absence of a statutory basis, most courts hold that
rights of entry are inalienable. See generally 2 POwELL, REAL PROPERY §§ 281-82,
284 (1950); Staims, op. cit. supra note 33, §§ 33-35.
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terest.37 It might be contended that if these interests are releasable,
there is no valid reason that they are not registerable.38
Even if the New York court is correct in its conclusion that
marketability legislation cannot be upheld on the same theory as
recording acts, the persuasiveness of the Miles opinion is still not
established. The court made little attempt to discuss the important
issue of whether or not the statute would be supportable on any
other theory.39 The police power may be invoked for more than the
singular purpose of preventing frauds. Generally, a valid use of the
police power requires a substantial relationship of the challenged
legislation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.40
Previous decisions have established that economic interests are, or
may be, sufficiently related to the general welfare to support state
action under the police power. 41 In other states where the validity of
37Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Putnam, 249 N.Y. 111, 116, 162 N.E.
601, 603 (1928); Atkins v. Gillespie, 156 Tenn. 137, 141, 299 S.W. 776, 777-78 (1927);
2 POWELL op. cit. supra note 36, § 281.
28 One policy expressed by the court in Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian Church v.
Putnam, supra note 37, was that certain interests in land are "strictly construed
because they tend to destroy estates. Public interests dictate that real property shall
be readily transferable and that titles shall be marketable." Id. at 115, 162 N.E. at 602.
Thus, the court allowed a potential representative who technically had no interest
at the time not only to release whatever interest he might in the future acquire, but
also, by the same act and in the same manner, to bar the rights of future representa-
tives.
It may be contended that if such a potential representative has the power to
destroy the rights of future representatives for his sole benefit, he should have the
power to preserve them. In that case he is also preserving his own interests, since
he may turn out to be the representative when the condition is breached and the
reverter matures. The potential future representative is better protected under the
recording law than under the doctrine of release.
If the present representative should choose to relinquish his interest, and neces-
sarily the interests of potential future representatives, such future representatives are no
more disadvantaged by the recording requirements of the marketability law than by
the doctrine of release.
39 See 15 N.Y.2d at 371-74, 207 N.E.2d at 185-87, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 135-37.
10 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 436 (1934); Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928); People v. Title & Mortgage Guar.
Co., 264 N.Y. 69, 84, 190 N.E. 153, 157 (1934).
In the latter case it was stated that "legislation which impairs the obligation of a
contract or otherwise deprives a person of his property can be sustained only when
enacted for the promotion of the general good of the public, the protection of the
lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people and when the means
adopted to secure that end are reasonable. . . . Even 'the economic interests of the
state may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power not-
withstanding interference with contracts.'" People v. Title & Mortgage Guar. Co.,
supra at 84, 190 N.E. at 157 (quoting from Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
supra, decided less than three months earlier).
" See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, supra note 40; People v. Title &
Mortgage Guar. Co., supra note 40.
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marketable title legislation has been upheld, the courts have largely
based their decisions on this aspect of the police power; 42 further, it
was this element on which the lower court in the Miles case based
its decision upholding the validity of the New York law.4a Yet, in
reversing the lower court decision, the Court of Appeals did not dis-
cuss economic welfare as a possible basis for such legislation. In-
stead it focused on the burden of recording imposed by the market-
ability law and apparently evaluated the statute on the assumption
that this particular burden can only be imposed in specified situa-
tions. 44 This attitude ignores the frequently stated proposition that
a reasonable burden may be imposed if it will accomplish an ac-
ceptable public goal.45 By ignoring the issue of economic interest,
the Miles decision negatively implies that such interest is not a
sufficient basis for invocation of the police power or for the imposi-
tion of the burden of recording to preserve ownership of certain
interests. Because of this implication, the Miles case may lack per-
suasiveness in those jurisdictions in which it is recognized that police
power may be exercised for valid economic reasons.
42 See Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 493, 130 N.E.2d
111, 114 (1955); Tesdell v. Hanes, 248 Iowa 742, 749, 82 N.W.2d 119, 123 (1957); Wichcl-
man v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 99, 83 N.W.2d 800, 805 (1957).
"s Board of Educ. v. Mills, 18 App. Div. 2d 87, 93, 238 N.Y.S.2d 766, 772 (1963).
See text accompanying note 12 supra.
" 15 N.Y.2d at 370-71, 207 N.E.2d at 185, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 134-35. See text ac-
companying note 31 supra.
"5 See, e.g., Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 443 (1939); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934). In the Blaisdell case, supra, the Supreme
Court stated that the "question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts
incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end."
Id. at 438.
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